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INTRODUCTION
This action was commenced by the Labor Commission
(Commission) filing an abstract of judgment with the district court. It
dealt with a wage payment claim brought by Marc Cummings against
Derek Price and others.

The abstract set out the holdings of the

Commission's Default and Order to Pay decision.

The decision was a

final agency action.
The Commission, among other actions, filed a writ of garnishment
in this action.

Mr. Price challenged the validity of the writ of

garnishment by challenging the Commission's decision.
No appeal has been taken from the final agency action.

Instead,

Mr. Price asked the district court, in the garnishment proceeding, to
overturn the Labor Commission's decision and final agency action.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court have jurisdiction to consider the validity

of the challenged administrative decisions, not on appeal or review, but
during a garnishment proceeding years later?

Preservation and Standard of Review
This issue was raised by the Commission below and was ruled on
by the district court.

R. 169-71, 298-303.

This Court reviews the

district court's conclusions of law de novo "according no deference to its
resolution of such issues." In re Adoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35,

'if 41,

308 P.3d 382.
2.

Did the district court err by not applying res judicata to

preclude Derek Price from collaterally attacking the Commission's
decision in the related administrative proceeding?

Preservation and Standard of Review
This issue was raised by the Commission below and was ruled on
by the district court.

R. 1 73-76, 303-04. This Court reviews the

district court's conclusions of law de novo "according no deference to its
resolution of such issues." In re Adoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35,
3.

'if 41.

Did the district court err in holding that the Commission

should have sent notice to Mr. Price by certified mail instead of first
class mail?
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Preservation and Standard of Review
This issue was raised by the Commission below and was ruled on
by the district court.

R. 171-73, 300-01. This Court reviews the

district court's conclusions of law de novo "according no deference to its
resolution of such issues." In re Adoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35,

if 41,

308 P .3d 382.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Marc Cummings filed a wage dispute claim with the
Commission against Level II Mentoring, L.L.C., and Mad Cow
Productions, L.L.C..

Mr. Derek Price had been listed as the sole

manager of the manager-managed Mad Cow Productions from the time
its Articles of Incorporation were filed through the proceedings before
the district court.

Mr. Price was also listed as a member of the

member-managed company Level II Mentoring from the time its
Articles of Incorporation were filed through the proceedings before the
district court.
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The Commission mailed to Mr. Price copies of the notice of a
wage claim, its Preliminary Findings, and its Default and Order to Pay
to the addresses shown for him on the Commission's records.

The

mailing was done in accordance with the applicable statutes.

None of

these mailings were returned as undeliverable by the U. S. Postal
Service.
The Commission filed an Abstract of Judgment in the district
court. R. 1-2.

The abstract set out the unpaid wages, fines, and

attorney fees established by the Commission's decision.

The

Commission filed the abstract to enforce its decision and obtain for Mr.
Cummings his unpaid wages. Among other efforts made to satisfy the
judgment, the Commission filed a writ of garnishment against Derek
Price . Mr. Price, rather than addressing the writ of garnishment that
he sought to quash, he filed a motion to set aside the underlying
judgment, and a reply in support thereof.

R. 84-127, 238-53.

The

Commission filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Price's motion.
R. 165-210.
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In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court held
that Mr. Price could collaterally attack the Commission's decision.

R.

299-300. It also held that the Commission should be required to
provide notice in this and similar actions by certified mail, even though
no statute requires it.

R. 300-01.

The district court quashed the

outstanding writ of garnishment against Mr. Price (R. 306) but did not
set aside the abstract of judgment. R. 304.

Instead the district court

ordered Mr. Price to "pursue a motion to set aside in the administrative
proceeding with notice to all interested parties." R. 306. The district
court also denied "at this juncture" Mr. Price's request for attorney fees.
R. 305.

The Commission timely filed its Notice of Appeal.

Mr. Price then timely filed his Notice of Cross-Appeal.

R. 309-10.

R. 313-15.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Price's challenge to the Commission's decision is untimely.
The current action deals with an abstract of judgment and efforts to
collect on the Commission's decision.

Mr. Price can't use this

proceeding to mount a belated challenge to the final agency action.
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The district court did not have jurisdiction to address Mr. Price's
arguments.
Mr. Price's arguments are also barred by res judicata. A
garnishment or other proceeding trying to enforce an agency's final
action is subject to res judicata and can't be used to challenge the final
agency action.
The applicable statute requires that the Commission's notices in
wage claim proceedings be mailed to the parties.

The statute does not

require the use of a particular form of mail, such as certified mail.

The

only times that this Court or the Utah Supreme Court have required
the use of certified mail is when the legislature has mandated its use by
statute.

ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To
Consider Derek Price's Untimely Challenge To The
Labor Commission's Order
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) gives parties 30

days to file a petition for judicial review from a final agency action.
Utah Code § 63G-4-401(3)(a). "The timeliness of the ... petition, on

6

the other hand, is a question of jurisdictional significance."

Rivers v. U.S. Oil Sands, Inc., 2014 UT 25,

Living

if 18, 344 P.3d 568. In

Living Rivers, no party sought review of the granting of a permit in
2008. When a modified permit was granted in 2011, Living Rivers filed
a petition for judicial review, but sought to challenge the granting of the
2008 permit.
The Supreme Court held that it was without jurisdiction because
the petition was filed more than 30 days after the issuance of the 2008
permit.

Id. at

if 21. "The jurisdictional question presented is a matter

dictated by the substance of Living Rivers' petition for review."

Id.

Because the substance of the petition was directed to the 2008 permit,
the Court held that was without jurisdiction and dismissed the petition
as being untimely.

Id.

The timely filing of a petition for review, like the timely filing of a
notice of appeal, is jurisdictional. Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Serv.,
2007 Ut App 280,

if 7, 167 P.3d 1102. Mr. Price did not file a timely

petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision.
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Mr. Price could not use this garnishment proceeding to challenge
those prior decisions; he could only challenge the garnishment itself.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 64D does not authorize a challenge to the
underlying judgment, only to matters related to the garnishment.

"The

district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider a collateral attack on an underlying judgment in
the context of the garnishment proceedings."

Utah State Tax Comm 'n

v. Echols, 2006 UT App 19 (Per Curiam).
While Mr. Price can't use a garnishment proceeding to challenge
the underlying default decision, he is not left without a possible remedy.
As a defaulted party, he can ask the Commission to set aside the default
"by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure."

Utah Code§ 63G-4-209(3)(a).

This motion would be

made to the presiding officer who granted the default.

Id. § 209(3)(b).

The decision of the presiding officer would be subject to agency review.

Id. § 209(3)(c).
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II.

Res Judicata Barred Mr. Price's Attempt To Challenge The
Labor Commission's Order In A Garnishment Proceeding
The district court considered Mr. Price's challenge to the

Commission's decisions.

It did not limit its review to questions

concerning the writ of garnishment that was before it.

The district

court failed to consider the Commission's argument that res judicata
precluded the court's review of the Commission's decision. Apparently
the district court accepted Mr. Price's claim that the Commission's
decisions could be collaterally attacked because the Commission filed a
civil enforcement proceeding (Abstract of Judgment) with the court.
299-300.
But this argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in

Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942
P.2d 933, 939-40 (Utah 1997) (applying res judicata and collateral
estoppel to prevent the Department of Corrections from collaterally
attacking the Board's administrative orders in a civil enforcement
action brought by the Board).

"Res judicata, which subsumes the

doctrine of collateral estoppel, applies to administrative adjudications
in Utah."

Id. at 938 (internal quotation marks omitted).
9

R.

Mr. Price's claims are barred by the claim preclusion branch of res
judicata.

Claim preclusion has three elements. "First, both cases

must involve the same parties or their privies."

Gillmor v. Family Link

LLC, 2012 UT 38, if 10, 284 P.3d 622 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It is undisputed that the parties in the garnishment action
are the same as those that were before the Commission.

"Second, the

claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first
suit or be one that could and should have been raised in the first
action." Id.

The issue before the Commission was the claim for

unpaid wages of Marc Cummings.

The Commission determined that

Derek Price, among others, was liable for these unpaid wages.

The

claims Mr. Price now asserts challenging the Commission's decisions
could and should have been brought during the agency proceedings.
"Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits." Id.

This element is met as well.

Indeed, Mr. Price's attack

on the Commission's decision is because it is a final judgment that the
Commission seeks to enforce through this garnishment action.
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A default judgment is a final judgment for the purposes of res
judicata. "The Judgment by Default was a final judgment, i.e., one
which puts an end to a lawsuit by declaring that the plaintiff is or is not
entitled to recover the remedy sought."

Schoney v. Memorial Estates,

Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Mr. Price's claims are
barred by res judicata.
Because res judicata applies, this Court does not need to
determine whether Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345 P.3d 655,
should be applied retroactively. It is undisputed that Heaps held that
managers and members of Limited Liability Corporations were not
employers under Utah's Payment of Wages Act.

Id. at,, 11-18. This

is contrary to the prior practice of the Commission.

The Commission

has followed the Heaps decision since it was issued.

Res judicata

precludes Mr. Price from trying to apply Heaps to overturn a final
judgment that was issued years before it was decided.

New precedent

has been applied retroactively to actions that are ongoing.

Heartwood

Home Health & Hospice LLC v. Rita Huber, 2016 UT App 183, , , 5, 1012, 382 P .3d 1074 (new Utah Supreme Court decision applied
11

retroactively to ongoing action on appeal at the time the decision was
made).

But plaintiffs counsel are unaware of any Utah appellate

decision that permits a closed case to be reopened so that a new decision
can be applied to it.

III.

Utah Law Does Not Require The Service Of Notice By
Certified Mail In Wage Claim Proceedings
UAPA requires that notices to parties be mailed.

63G-4-201(2)(b).

Utah Code §

The Commission has defined mail to mean "first class

mailing sent to the parties of a wage claim or claim of retaliation, to the
last known address on the Commission's record."
Code R610-3-2(I).

Utah Administrative

Nothing in the statute requires that any particular

type of mail be used, such as certified mail.

But the district court held

that certified mail was required even though the legislature did not see
fit to do so.

R. 300-01.

Utah law only requires that notice be sent by certified mail when
the applicable statute expressly says so.

In fact, the Supreme Court

has held that a prescribed form of service requires only that type of
service, not something more onerous.

For example, in Anderson v.

Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), the Court
12

addressed the Utah Motor Carrier Act's requirement that notice be sent
by certified mail.

Id. at 825. The PSC had complied with the certified

mail requirement, but Anderson still argued that he should have been
served by personal service. The Court disagreed and held that certified
mail was adequate and personal service, or proof of actual notice was
not required: "The most burdensome form of service articulated [in the
statute] is certified mail.

Thus, we can infer that, at most, the

legislature intended that the Commission be obligated to serve its
orders by certified mail, not by personal service." Id.
Likewise, this Court recently held that a statute mandating that
notice be sent by "certified mail" required notice by U.S. Postal Service
certified mail, not some other method of sending notice.

Sons Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2018 UT App 6,

~~

John Kuhni &

20-21. This Court

only required the use of the statutory method for providing notice.

It

did not require, as did the district court, the use of a more burdensome
method of service.
Here, UAPA requires only that notice be mailed.

So the

Commission was required only to mail its notice, not to use certified
13

mail.

The Commission is not aware of any Utah appellate decision

that requires agencies to use certified mail when the applicable statute
requires only service by mail.
Nonetheless, the district court held that certified mail was
necessary because the Department of Commerce's business directory "is
open to fraud."

R. 301. And yet the district court acknowledged that

"[n]either party has presented evidence of whether this sort of situation
has occurred in the past and how often." Id.

Without explanation, the

district court stated that certified mail would be more effective at
reaching the right person than first class mail.

Id.

But none of the

Commission's notices mailed to Mr. Price were returned as
undeliverable.

If the addresses on file for Mr. Price were erroneous,

the notices would not have reached him whether mailed first class or
certified.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the district court's decision should
be reversed.
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Respectfully submitted this

19th

day of April, 2018.

Isl Brent A. Bur nett
BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Solicitor General
Attorney for the Office of Recovery
Services
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''Addendum A''

FILED DISTRICT COURT

Third Judicial District

AUG 0 2 2017
~ALTlAKECOUNTY

\J

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LABOR COMMISSION,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,

Case No. 126918635

vs.
LEVEL II MENTORING, LLC; AARON
CHRISTNER; MAD COW
PRODUCTIONS, LLC; RYAN JENSEN;
and DEREK PRICE,

Judge Su Chon

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Derek Price's Motion to Set Aside
Judgment, Order to Return Garnished Funds, and Sanctions. Oral argument was held
June 19. The Cc:>urt first stayed the continuing garnishment until it could rule on the
motion that was taken under advisement. The following is the Court's decision.
BACKGROUND
In 2010, Marc Cummings brought a wage dispute to the Utah Labor Commission
("Commission") against Level II Mentoring and Mad Cow Productions.

The

Administrative Procedures Act requires a claim be "mailed" to the relevant parties, but it
does not explain what type of mailing is sufficient to provide notice.

See_ Utah Code

Ann. § 63G-4-201 ("When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the

00295

agency shall: (i) mail the notice of agency action to each party.").

The Commission

adopted a standard mailing procedure: "first class mailing sent to the parties of a wage
claim or claim of retaliation, to the last known address on the Commission's record."
Administrative Code .R610-3-2(1). The Commission's record, in turn, is the business
directory kept by the Utah Department of Commerce of each state-licensed business
and its principal agents and their mailing addresses.
Mr. Price asserts that the Labor Commission's practice was to issue a wage
claim against the principal agents and managers of an offending business. 1 Mad Cow's
business registration listed Derek Price as its agent and manager with an address of
3068 S. 1000 E. in Salt Lake City. Level II Mentoring's records listed Mr. Price as its
ag7nt with an address of 553 E. 1050 N. in Orem. In September 2010, the Commission
mailed the wage claim to Mr. Price at both addresses. When Mr. Price did not respond
within the time permitted, the Commission entered preliminary findings in November
2010 and again mailed copies to him at the address in the corporate records. And
again, the Commission received no response, so in January 2011 it mailed him an order
to pay/order on default for $12,590. Each document was sent first class mail to Derek
Price at the Salt Lake City and Orem addresses on file with the Department of
Commerce.
In 2012, the Commission began this action by filing an Abstract of Final Award
for $12,590 with the district court. The Abstract states that it is brought under section
34-28-9 of Utah code:
An abstract of any final award under this section may be filed in the office
of the clerk of the district court of any county in the state. If so filed, the
abstract shall be docketed in the judgment docket of that district court.
t

The Labor Commission did not refute that assertion so the Court presumes that it is true.
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Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-9(4)(a). The Abstract states that it was mailed to Mr. Price at
the two addresses on file. None of the mailings was ever returned to the Commission
as undeliverable.
Mr. Price claims he never received any of the Commission's mailings and only
learned of the judgment in early 2017 when his employer was served with a writ to
garnish his wages. Mr. Price claims he quit fV!ad Cow in 2010 and moved to California.
The Salt Lake Address is unfamiliar to him, and the Orem address was his residence
years earlier in the 1990s. He denies being a principal in either Level II or Mad Cow
and believes that the actual principals, co-Defendants Christner and Jensen,
fraudulently listed him on the business records without his knowledge.
Mr. Price made his first appearance in this case on February 9, 2017 with a pro
se document titled Reply and Request for Hearing in which he states that the judgment
was in error because he was merely an employee of Mad Cow and that the "owners
(Aaron Christner and Ryan Jensen) used my ID provided for employment to put their
business under my name. I had a similar thing in the state of Idaho from them I just got
removed." In a February 17 hearing at which Mr. Price appeared pro se, the Court
stayed the garnishment order of Mr. Price's wages for one month to see if the parties
could come to a settlement. Mr. ·Price states that he tried several times to speak with
the Commission but that the Commission was unwilling to alter the judgment and
remove Mr. Price as a liable party.

DISCUSSION
Mr. Price now moves the Court to set aside the judgment and order a return of
his garnished wages. The Commission argues that its Abstract of Judgment was filed

00298
-- - - -

under the labor code, which does not provide defendants the right to collaterally attack
the underlying merits of the judgment.
(4)(a)An abstract of any final award under this section may be filed in the
office of the clerk of the district court of any county in the state. If so filed,
the abstract shall be docketed in the judgment docket of that district court.
(c) Unless the award was previously satisfied, if an abstract is filed and
docketed, the award constitutes a lien upon the employer's real property
that is situated. in the .county in which the abstract is filed for a period of
eight years after the day on which the award is granted,
(d) Execution may be issued on the award within the same time and in the
same manner and with the same effect as if the award were a judgment of
the district court.
Utah Code Ann.§ 34-28-9(4)(a).
Mr. Price argues that the Abstract of Judgment was also brought under the
Administrative Procedures Act, which does permit a collateral attack on the merits:
·(1){a) In addition to other remedies provided by law, an agency may seek
enforcement of an order by seeking civil enforcement in ttie district courts.
(d) The action may request, and the court may grant, any of the
following:
(i) declaratory relief;
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive relief;
{iii) any other civil remedy provided by law; or
(iv) any combination of the foregoing.
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency's·order, in addition
to any other defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the
ground that:
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued by an agency
·
without jurisdiction to issue the order;
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant,
(c) the defendant has not violated the order; or
(d) the defendant violated the order but has subsequently complied.
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement of an agency's
order are reviewable in the same manner as other civil cases.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501 (emphasis added).

Mr. Price claims the Commission

does not have jurisdiction over him due to its failure to properly serve him, and the order
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does not apply to him because he was not a principal of the companies sued. Because
it does appear that section -501 permits a collateral attack, the Court will address Mr.
Price's concerns.
First, with respect to the jurisdiction question, Mr. Price seeks relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) for a void judgment.

Where service of process is

inadequate, a judgment is void and a district court is without personal jurisdiction. Smith
Springs, LLC

v. Fu/lingim, 2006 UT App 488, 1J 6 ("proper service ensures that an

individual will not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
Notice must be reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to give
interested parties an opportunity to protect their interests. Under this
standard, the proper inquiry focuses on whether the agency 'acted
reasonably in selecting means likely to inform persons affected, not
whether each [affected person] actually received notice. To determine
whether the agency has acted reasonably in choosing a method of notice,
we balance the interest sought to be protected against the interest of the
agency. In undertaking this analysis, we focus on whether the method of
service strikes a reasonable balance between the interests of the agency
and the affected individual, while keeping in mind that the state's burden is
less onerous in administrative proceedings.
Anderson v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822, 825 (Utah 1992) (internal

quotations and c!tations omitted).

In Anderson, the Motor Vehicle Act ·required the

Public Service Commission to send its orders by "certified mail to the designated person
at the address filed" with the agency. The agency tried several times to serve its order
on Anderson by certified mail, but Anderson refused to accept it. The Utah Supreme
Court held that the agency sufficiently provided notice by (a) sending it certified and by
(b) sending it to the address Anderson had given the agency for the purpose of service
of process.

00300

Mr. Price argues that the Commission's policy -- sending notice of a claim by first
class mail to the name and address of the principal agents listed in the Department of
Commerce database - violated his due process rights to notice. It appears that notice
by first class mail has not been addressed' by Utah's appellate courts.
Service by first class mail may be adequate most of the time, but this situation is
a reminder that the Department of Commerce's business directory is open to fraud
when people can register _a business in the name of another without their knowledge or
consent.

Neither party has presented evidence of whether this sort of situation has

occurred in the past and how often. The burden on the Commission to alter its service
requirement to certified mail would be minimal for its outgoing mail. Certified mail would
have avoided this situation where Mr. Price was blindsided with the judgment against
him. Simply sending notices by certified mail would be almost as effective at reaching
the correct person than personally serving the parties but without the burden and
expense of paying a process server. The Court notes that certified mail would meet the
notice burden under Rule 4 for service of a civil complaint, and the burden "is less
onerous ·in administrative proceedings." Anderson, 839 P.2d at 825.
Second, Mr. Price has raised a defense that he is not an employer under the
Payment of Wages Act.

Utah's Payment of Wages Act permits the Commission to

include as a defendant in a wage claim dispute the party's "employer." The Act defines
employer:
"Employer'' includes every person, firm, partnership, association,
corporation, receiver or other officer of a court of this state, and any agent
or officer of any of the above-mentioned classes, employing any person in
this state.

00301

Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-2(c). Traditionally, the Commission interpreted employer to
include anyone who was listed as a member or officer. Because Mr. Price was listed on
the official records for Level II and Mad Cow, the Commission included him. But in
2015, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to clarify "employer" under the Payment of
Wages Act, and it held that the phrase "employing any person in this state" in the
statute limits liability only to individuals who employ others.
This conclusion is buttressed by long-accepted principles of Utah
corporate law. The general rule is that a corporation is an entity separate
and distinct from its officers, .shareholders and directors and that they will
not be held personally liable for the corporation's debts and obligations...
. Had the Legislature intended to impose personal liability in contravention
of long-standing principles of corporate law, it would have done so
expressly as it has in other sections of the code.
Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26,

1J

16, 345 P.3d 655 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Consequently, Heaps held that employees who do not employ other
employees are not personally liable under the Act. 2 (The Labor Commission has since
changed its practice and does not include non-employing officers as defendants in
wage claim cases.)
Mr. Price argues that Heaps is retroactive and should apply to him, while the
Commission argues that Heaps is prospective only.

·

The general rule ·from time immemorial is that the ruling of a court is
deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and
prospectively. In civil cases, at least, constitutional law neither requires nor
prohibits retroactive operation of an overruling decision, but in the vast
majority of cases a decision is effective both prospectively and
2

In 2017, the code was amended to define "employer" to mean the same as it is defined
in the federal labor code: "'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, but
does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer) or
anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.n 29 U.S.C. §
203(d).
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retrospectively, even an overruling decision. Whether the general rule
should be departed from depends on whether a substantial injustice would
otherwise occur.
We may, in our discretion, prohibit retroactive operation where the
"overruled law has been justifiably relied upon or where retroactive
operation creates a burden." For example, we have limited or prohibited
retroactive application of decisions invalidating or reinterpreting certain
statutes. In these cases, the challenged statute had been justifiably relied
on, and complete retroactive application of the statute would have
irreparably burdened the individuals or entities who relied on it.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d .661, 676 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted). Heaps did not make

new law but rather clarified existing law.

Consequently, Heaps should be applied

retroactively, and Mr. Price is not properly deemed an "employer," and thus is not a
prop.er defendant here. See also Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2016 UT 10,

1J 28,

368 P.3d 846 (court could not find a "single case applying a decision purely
prospectively that did not also expressly recognize the decision would significantly alter
the legal landscape by ending or overruling a relied-upon practice, statute, or case.").
Mr. Price's collateral attack of the judgment based on lack of jurisdiction and that
the j~dgment does not apply to him are well taken.
Res Judicata

The Commission argues that Mr. Price's arguments regarding the Commission's
finding of his liability is barred by res judicata, which requires:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second,
the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first
suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in .the first
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.
Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,

1J 20,

16 P.3d 1214. Res judicata

does not apply ~ere because the abstract of judgment case is not a separate cause of
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action. Furthermore, the Commission's finding of Mr. Price's liability was not made on
the merits but was a default judgment based on his failure to respond to the charges.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Commission argues that Mr. Price failed to exhaust his administrative
'remedies. It suggests he should have appealed the Commission's decision, but the
time in which he had to do it has ·long passed. Mr. Price has not filed a motion to set
aside as suggested by the Commission's counsel. He called the Commission to see
what they would do given his circumstances, and it refused to reconsider.
Mr. Price argues that the Court should relieve him of the obligation to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
[T]he court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement
to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable hann
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring
exhaustion.
Utah Code Ann. ·§ 63G-4-401(2)(b).

When the Court gave Mr. Price a month to

negotiate with the Commission, the Commission refused and made it clear it would not
change its position on Mr. Price's liability. At the hearing, counsel for the Commission,
indicated that Mr. Price could still file a motion to set aside before the Commission. Mr.
Price could be permitted to forego his administrative remedies and come directly to the_
district court. However, the wage claimant has not been made aware of this pending
action nor the defenses that Mr. Price asserts. The Court is concerned that setting
aside the abstract at this point would require notice to the wage claimant.
Mr. Price asks the Court to order the Commission to return the amount that has
already been garnished. However, the concern here is that the Commission has already
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sent the payments to the wage claimant. The Commission no longer has control over
the funds. It seems that Mr. Price would need to include the wage claimant under any
motion to set aside the judgment.

Attorney fees under bad faith statute
Mr. Price seeks attorney's fees·under the bad faith statute.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.]

Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-825. Mr. Price argues that because the Abstract of Judgment
was filed under the UAPA, section 63G-4-501, it was obligated to first determine that the
order was well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law.
The commission . . . shall commence an action under Section 63G-4501 for civil enforcement of a final order of the commission issued under
Subsection 34A-5-107(11) if:
(a) the order finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that a
respondent has engaged or is engaging in discriminatory or
prohibited employment practices made unlawful by this chapter;
(b) counsel to the commission or the attorney general determines
after reasonable inquiry that the order is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law;
(c) the respondent has not received an order of automatic stay or
discharge from the United States Bankruptcy Court; and
(d)(i) the commission has not accepted a conciliation agreement to
which the aggrieved party and respondent are parties; or (ii) the
respondent has not conciliated or complied with the final order of
the commission within 30 days from the date the order is issued.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-108(1) (emphasis added).
demonstrate. that the Commission acted in bad faith.

At this point, it is insufficient to
If it did proceed in this action

based on a prior interpretation of the law and believed in good faith that its counsel told
them it would not be retroactive, it would not be bad faith.

However, the facts are

insufficient to determine that bad faith has occurred at this juncture.
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Accordingly, the Court orders that the writ of garnishment be quashed and that
Mr. Price pursue a motion to set aside in the administrative proceeding with notice to all
'

interested parties. No further order is necessary.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2017.
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